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ON DETERRENCE, DEFENSE, AND ARMS CONTROL IN HONOR OF
COLIN S. GRAY

Keith B. Payne

For five decades, Professor Colin Gray’s scholarly writings contributed tremendously to our understanding of strategy, and his wise counsel benefited U.S.
security policies enormously. His intellectual depth, rigor, curiosity, and wit
were unparalleled, as were the time, energy, and stamina he devoted to writing
and lecturing. To say that Colin was prolific is a profound understatement. His
scholarly published canon includes more than thirty books and three hundred
articles. He also authored or contributed to scores of unpublished reports for
various U.S. government offices. To achieve such a record, Colin often would
work on multiple texts simultaneously. As a consequence, two substantial books
he authored occasionally would be published in the same year—once, I believe,
in roughly the same month.1
Equally important, colleagues and students of all views and backgrounds
greatly enjoyed and appreciated Colin’s unassuming affability and easy charm.
While frequently involved in the back and forth of strategic policy debates, he
typically remained a gentleman—reflecting a genuine civility that seems rare today. In one extended press interview, Colin referred to a prominent Washington
politician in a mildly unflattering way. When the article was published subsequently and Colin saw his comment in print, he mailed a personal apology to the
politician. The latter responded to Colin that he had been called much worse but
never before had received an apology.
The scope and breadth of Colin’s curiosity and writing far transcended any
single topic. This brief discussion focuses on only three areas of his enduring
scholarly interest: deterrence, missile defense, and arms control. To summarize
the scope and nuance of Colin’s views on strategic deterrence and related issues
would require a sizable book—which undoubtedly will be written. The much
more modest goal here, however, is to provide a readable and select synopsis of his
basic points and positions, which were driven by his philosophical realism and a
relentless dedication to logic and evidence—wherDr. Keith B. Payne is a cofounder with Colin Gray
of the National Institute for Public Policy, profes- ever that led.
sor emeritus of the Graduate School of Defense and
Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, and a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.
Naval War College Review, Winter 2021, Vol. 74, No. 1

THE INNOVATIVE REALIST
Colin’s work typically was highly innovative,
and inevitably it provided added value. It may
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be helpful to offer a few select examples of the unique creativity and insight he
brought to the field of strategic studies. In a 1981 article appearing in the journal
International Security, Colin essentially introduced the now-thriving study of
strategic culture as a critical subfield of strategic studies.2 He reintroduced the
study of geopolitics in a 1977 book, The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era, and subsequently authored several innovative texts on the subject, including Maritime
Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West (1986) and The Geopolitics of
Super Power (1988).
Colin coined the title “second nuclear age” to identify the post–Cold War
era—nomenclature that subsequently was adopted internationally. More than
just a new name, this descriptor reflected his countercultural view that nuclear
weapons would not lose their salience after the Cold War—that is, the emerging
era would be different, but nuclear weapons would continue to cast a long shadow
over international security concerns. Recent history demonstrates that Colin was,
of course, correct in this regard.
Colin’s books entitled The Second Nuclear Age (1999) and Another Bloody Century (2005) presented the harsh realities he deemed more likely than the thenprevailing near-utopian expectations of great-power comity and a cooperative
“new world order.” In 1999, for example, Colin dissented from the accepted wisdom of the day that terrorism and rogue states were the only remaining threats,
pointed to “the strong possibility that world politics two to three decades hence
will be increasingly organized around the rival poles of U.S. and Chinese power,”
and predicted that China “would menace Japan.” He also then observed that the
return of Russia as a political-military challenge to the West (which he fully expected) “immediately would threaten independent Ukraine [and] the Baltics.”3
Colin expected that the immediate post–Cold War period was a (likely brief)
interlude before another cycle of sharp great-power competition and potential
conflict. History demonstrates that Colin again was prescient.
Colin’s contrarian expectations, of course, did not reflect his preferences.
They followed from his observations and realist philosophical roots, and his corresponding view that history provides the best guide for our expectations of the
future. As noted, his expectations were far removed from the accepted wisdom of
the day (i.e., that the arising new world order would see the dwindling salience of
nuclear weapons, and that great-power cooperation and amity would replace cycles of crises and conflict). Colin did not believe that the exhaustion of the Soviet
Union and the rise of China meant the dawn of a peaceful new age; to the contrary,
he expected new security challenges to arise and old challenges to return. Again,
recent history has shown that Colin’s projections were correct, if unfashionable.
Beginning in the 1970s, Colin’s work played an increasingly significant role in
the evolution of U.S. thinking, particularly within the Department of Defense.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/6
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Very few scholars have affected U.S. policies so directly. When Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis introduced the 2018 National Defense Strategy, he quoted
Colin and referred to him as “the most near-faultless strategist alive today,” and
Colin is the only academic with highlighted quotes in both the 2018 Nuclear
Posture Review and the 2019 Missile Defense Review.4
THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE
An overarching theme and goal of Colin’s writings and lectures was identifying
the most effective approach to deterring war, particularly nuclear war—that is,
war prevention. He also recognized the possibility that deterrence could fail
and nuclear war could ensue despite the best preventive efforts. Correspondingly, he reasoned that because nuclear war is possible, the United States should
think prudently through “what to do” in the event. He considered an officially
declared U.S. response of the 1960s and early 1970s—including a large-scale
nuclear strike against Soviet society—to be complete, immoral folly and a faulty
guide for measuring the adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces. His basic proposition
was simple but not simplistic: the West must seek unceasingly to deter war.
Colin had no confidence in the notion that nuclear employment, once initiated, would remain limited or that nuclear war could serve a political goal.5
But, if deterrence failed nevertheless and war ensued, U.S. actions should not
be impromptu by default or a spasmodic nuclear response that consciously
abandoned any purposeful goal beyond revenge and societal destruction.
Rather, they should be guided by thoughtful planning to deter further nuclear
escalation and minimize societal destruction to the extent feasible—with full
recognition that, while neither goal was certain, rejecting measures that might
help limit escalation and destruction would be grossly irresponsible. That is
hardly a radical proposition.6
But openly discussing what to do if deterrence fails was outside the norms of
most academic discourse. Doing so was then and continues to be criticized as
reflecting a sympathy for “nuclear war fighting” as opposed to deterrence. Colin
ran afoul of the reigning wisdom that the “stable” balance of terror, properly
tended, would not fail short of irrationality, and that nuclear war was “unthinkable”—and certainly not to be discussed publicly, other than by some, occasionally, as a political tool for rousing popular opposition to U.S. nuclear arms. But
that was not Colin’s purpose.
Because Colin pointed to the need to plan as prudently as possible for deterrence failure and his publications occasionally included the word victory (in one
case, in an article’s provocative title created without the authors’ permission, or
even knowledge), some critics asserted that his goal was not deterrence but rather
planning to fight and win a nuclear war. This is a wholly mistaken interpretation
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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of his work and intent, including his occasional use of the word victory. As noted,
he was highly skeptical of any notion that the employment of nuclear weapons
would remain limited and thus could serve a political goal. Indeed, he viewed
nuclear war as a potentially unparalleled horror to be prevented, if possible,
through diplomacy and deterrence. These were the goals of his scholarship on the
subject. In at least some cases the mischaracterization of his work as sympathetic
to nuclear war fighting obviously was contrived for the purpose of creating a
provocative nuclear straw man against which to argue.
In short, Colin’s highest scholarly priority was to understand how best to prevent nuclear war, and he was convinced that seeking to think through the question of what to do in the event of deterrence failure both was prudent and could
improve the prospects for deterring war. There was no trade-off.
ARMS CONTROL: A “HOUSE OF CARDS”
A prominent academic argument of the 1960s and 1970s was that the U.S.-Soviet
nuclear arms race of the time was a result of “action-reaction” cycles initiated by
the United States. Critics of U.S. nuclear forces typically argued that it was the
United States that instigated and propelled the U.S.-Soviet arms race, because
U.S. deployment of nuclear arms (the initial “action”) compelled the Soviet
Union to respond with a nuclear buildup (the inevitable “reaction”). This U.S.-led
action-reaction dynamic supposedly explained the U.S.-Soviet arms race.7
The policy argument that accompanied this action-reaction thesis, of course,
was that if only the United States would cease or curtail its nuclear-weapons programs, the Soviet Union could and would do likewise. Consequently, ending the
arms race was a U.S. opportunity and responsibility; if the United States curtailed
its nuclear armaments, the action-reaction arms-race dynamic would be replaced
by a U.S.-led inaction-inaction dynamic—bringing the arms race to a close.
However, if the United States continued to pursue nuclear programs, it would
continue to propel the arms race as well. This prevalent argument posited an
arms race continually led by the United States and its “first moves”—opponents
being reactive and largely benign cogs in this mechanistic process. The same
action-reaction contention, with U.S. culpability, has been on display since the
1960s and remains prominent in contemporary arguments against U.S. nuclear
arms and missile defense.
One of the earliest targets of Colin’s demand for logic and evidence was this
fashionable, U.S.-led, action-reaction/inaction-inaction thesis. His 1976 book
The Soviet-American Arms Race demolished this reductionist explanation of the
arms race, along with the corresponding assertion that U.S. inaction would produce Soviet inaction—that is, a “peace race.”8 He argued instead from evidence
that a variety of interactive and noninteractive behaviors and motivations, not
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/6
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the action-reaction dynamic, explained U.S. and Soviet nuclear-arms programs.
The bottom line of Colin’s work was that policies derived from the politically
powerful action-reaction thesis—that U.S. actions drove the arms race and U.S.
inaction would lead to Soviet inaction and an end to the arms race—were sure
to be frustrated, because the Soviet Union’s motives for its nuclear arms were far
more complex than the reductionist action-reaction thesis. Multiple later serious studies came to the same conclusion.9 In 1979, the Carter administration’s
Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, very publicly dismissed the action-reaction
thesis, noting that the Soviet Union “has shown no restraint—when we build,
they build, when we cut, they build.”10
Colin continued to challenge pervasive, fawning academic and government
expressions regarding nuclear-arms control. The title of his most comprehensive book on the subject, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (1992),
clearly signaled his conclusion, as do the titles of chapters 1 and 7, “The Magical Kingdom of Arms Control” and “To Bury Arms Control, Not to Praise It,”
respectively. On the basis of nearly a century of arms-control history (e.g., the
extensive arms-control record of the 1920s and 1930s and the U.S.-Soviet SALT/
START experience), he challenged the central, widely accepted claims for the
U.S.-Soviet strategic arms-control process: that it could move the superpowers’
strategic doctrines and force postures in mutually benign directions, and that the
dialogue on nuclear arms itself could be the dynamic for the transformation of
U.S.-Soviet relations away from hostility.
In stark contrast, Colin essentially explained that the character of political
relations among countries and their respective “strategic cultures” drive their
armament programs, and correspondingly the possibilities of arms control, and
that those political relations and cultures typically reflect both centuries of historical experience and contemporary issues. They ultimately govern countries’
armaments incentives and goals and set the boundaries for arms control. “The
political antagonism that generates the objective need for alleviation via arms
control—always assuming, again fallaciously, that arms control could control—is
the very reason why arms control must fail.”11 The fundamental resolution of
hostile political relations could lead naturally to significant relaxation of military
requirements and to arms control, but the reverse is not true. And, of course, if
previously hostile relations have become truly cordial, arms-control agreements
lose much of their significance.
Colin’s conclusion—that, despite all the fanfare and attention, the armscontrol process is incapable of transformative effects among hostile states because
it is limited by their hostility—again was wholly contrarian. However, given the
Cold War history of actual arms-control practice, his general conclusion increasingly became mainstream. Secretary Brown recognized the same nexus: “The
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

5

38

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 74 [2021], No. 1, Art. 6

[U.S.-Soviet] political relationship drove the success or failure of arms control
much more than the other way around.”12
From this foundation, Colin concluded that arms control “is either impossible or unimportant.” He referred to this as the “arms control paradox” and,
calling on historical evidence, demonstrated how it was reflected in “virtually
all twentieth-century experience with arms control or its absence.”13 Indeed,
the U.S. strategic arms-control aspiration to move Russian nuclear arms toward
“stability” (as understood in the West) largely was frustrated until political relations improved dramatically with the collapse of the Soviet Union—which had
little or nothing to do with the arms-control process.14 Since then that aspiration
has been frustrated, once again, with the return of stridently hostile U.S.-Russian
political relations.
ON DETERRENCE
In 1960, Herman Kahn observed the following about U.S. deterrence: “In spite
of our reliance on the idea that deterrence will work, we usually do not analyze
carefully the basic concepts behind such a policy.”15 But Colin did just that,
methodically identifying the logical contradictions and lack of evidence behind
accepted wisdom and fashionable Cold War thinking about nuclear deterrence.
When he began publishing on strategic deterrence and nuclear policy in the early
1970s, he was highly critical of most U.S. government expressions and academic
commentary on the subject. By the 1980s, however, U.S. policies, on a bipartisan
basis, had come to reflect much of Colin’s earlier thought.
Many of Colin’s basic points about strategic deterrence and missile defense
built on Kahn’s writings from the 1960s, particularly the latter’s On Thermonuclear War and Thinking about the Unthinkable. These two remarkable scholars
often reached the same conclusions, but their routes differed. Whereas Kahn’s
work manifestly was that of a physicist addressing issues of international politics
and power, Colin’s approach to the same subjects came from political science,
military history, and anthropology. Indeed, he focused on how the unique history, culture, and political context of nations could drive considerable variation in
different leaderships’ decision-making pertinent to the functioning of deterrence.
And, perhaps because of his British origins, he focused on America’s extended
deterrence relationship with allies.
Colin’s views on deterrence challenged conventional wisdom. He dismissed
notions widely accepted in the West that a reliably “stable balance of terror” could
be expected, given the Soviet adoption of U.S. views regarding nuclear weapons
(i.e., “convergence”). Because Soviet calculations generally were believed to mirror those of U.S. leaders, Soviet behavior was expected to follow familiar patterns, and deterrence therefore was expected to play out predictably and reliably.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/6
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This assumption regarding the predictability of Soviet behavior led some senior
figures in U.S. national security to conclude that mutual nuclear deterrence was
so stable that it functioned nearly automatically (i.e., “existential deterrence”).
“The terrible and unavoidable uncertainties in any recourse to nuclear war create
what could be called ‘existential’ deterrence, where the function of the adjective
is to distinguish this phenomenon from anything based on strategic theories or
declared policies. . . . As long as each side has thermonuclear weapons that could
be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible preemptive attack
[a “second-strike capability”], existential deterrence is strong.”16
Colin considered such notions of a balance of terror built on “mirror imaging”
to be a lamentable reflection of enduring traits of the American elite’s strategic
culture: tenacious groupthink and a “trait of machine-mindedness” that reduces
“the difficulties created by politics and opposed national policies to problems of
administration, management, and engineering.”17 He expanded on Kahn’s and
Albert J. Wohlstetter’s general contention that deterrence should not be expected
to function easily, reliably, and predictably. In 1958, Wohlstetter famously described the balance of terror as “fragile.”18 Colin concurred and emphasized that
an assumption of much Western Cold War thinking about deterrence “stability”—that Soviet and U.S. leaders perceived and calculated deterrence and the
balance of terror similarly—very likely was dangerously mistaken.
On the basis of his reading of available historical evidence, Colin rejected this
key presumption of similar U.S. and Soviet deterrence perceptions and calculations. He concluded instead that “assessments of deterrence stability err because
they do not take into account” differences in political will.19 For example, the
great differences distinguishing U.S. and Soviet strategic cultures would render
Soviet decision-making and the functioning of deterrence unpredictable: “Sensitivity to human loss has not been a prominent feature of Soviet (or Russian)
political culture. Anyone who believes that nuclear war should mean the same to
Americans and to Great Russians should reflect deeply on the contrasting histories of the two societies.” Thus, “there is massive uncertainty over ‘what deters’
(who? on what issue? when?).”20
In short, given the potential for variation often witnessed in political-military
history, Colin rejected the comforting and convenient mirror imaging that
undergirded expectations of a reliably stable balance of terror and existential
deterrence. He insisted that there is no relevant universal definition of rational
behavior, no nondescript countries A and B, and no Homo strategicus leadership
making predictably sensible decisions. Rather, leaderships with a wide range of
strategic cultures, perceptions, beliefs, goals, and passions can arrive at very different conclusions about what constitutes the most sensible deterrence-related
decision-making and behavior. Consequently, Colin emphasized—decades
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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before the point would become widely accepted as pertinent to U.S. deterrence
policy—that the great variation in national histories, perceptions, cultures, goals,
values, and so on likely will impact decision-making and behavior in unexpected
ways and render the functioning of deterrence inherently uncertain.
Some U.S. leaders during the Cold War expected the strategic arms-control
process to provide the opportunity to bring Soviet thinking in line with U.S.
balance-of-terror thought—that is, into the “real world” of nuclear weapons and
the inevitable logic of a stable balance of terror.21 If necessary, American tutorials
on deterrence could “educate” the Soviet political and military leadership into
“convergence” with U.S. thinking. Colin dismissed this notion as ethnocentric
folly, given the tremendous differences in the American and Russian histories,
perceptions, goals, and strategic cultures.22
Colin rebelled against the comforting notions that the balance of terror could
be made predictably stable and that strategic forces could be delineated neatly as
“stabilizing” or “destabilizing,” according to formula. His willingness to express
this view, along with considering what to do if deterrence fails, was viewed as
heretical by most of the nuclear deterrence “priesthood” of the time—as indeed it
was. Doing so challenged the most cherished presumptions regarding the dominant balance-of-terror deterrence formula: that it would be predictably stable as
long as the contenders played according to the rules of stability—which, by definition, they ultimately would do, because they were presumed to be comparably
sensible (per American sensibilities) and convergence would align Soviet views
with American logic.
Colin’s rejection of this fundamental presumption of reigning deterrence
theory significantly shaped his views about deterrence policy and strategic defenses. For example, he insisted that deterrence policy must be adjusted to take
into account the variability in an opponent’s perceptions, tolerances, values, and
goals—that is, deterrence planning must be done “with reference to the unique
details of the case in hand.”23 Correspondingly, he often explained that no such
thing as “the deterrent” exists, because no single approach or narrowly defined
force structure can be expected to deter. Rather, Colin concluded that U.S. deterrence planning and forces must be flexible and diverse to deter as effectively as
possible, given the great variations possible among opponents and contexts. His
iconoclastic views in this regard preceded by more than a decade their wholesale,
bipartisan acceptance—as is reflected in numerous contemporary open U.S. policy documents and the now-ubiquitous observation by civilian and military leaders that deterrence must be “tailored” to opponents because no “one size fits all.”
Colin was not iconoclastic by nature; it was not a role to which he aspired or
seemed to enjoy. Rather, the inadequacies he saw in the dominant strategic thinking of the mid–Cold War period left him little choice but to accept the role. By
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss1/6
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1980, however, the general outlines of U.S. strategic policy, including President
Carter’s “countervailing strategy,” were moving considerably closer to the positions Colin had articulated.
Finally, Colin did not prefer that the United States and the West rely on nuclear
deterrence for their security. He fully recognized its dangers. In fact, he believed
reliance on nuclear deterrence to be “foolish” if there were a realistic alternative.24
However, in line with realism, he foresaw no plausible alternative: “There is no
alternative, benign international political system. . . . Any rational person, one
might think, should be able to design a very much more reasonable and safer
global security system than we have today. I suspect that this is true but, alas,
entirely beside the historical point. Our current security and insecurity context is
the unplanned, certainly unintended, product of centuries of political history.”25
ON STRATEGIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Colin’s conclusion that the functioning of deterrence is inherently uncertain and
unpredictable also was key to his position regarding U.S. strategic defensive capabilities (i.e., homeland defense). He was well aware that limiting damage might
not be feasible in many possible nuclear scenarios, but believed that it could be
in others. Correspondingly, in contrast to basic balance-of-terror desiderata,
he considered irresponsible a policy by which the U.S. government consciously
would choose to forgo protecting society where possible. Such a policy contributed to the potential for unmitigated destruction should deterrence fail. “Nuclear
war is possible, and the U.S. government owes it to generations of Americans—
past, present, and future—to make prudent defense preparations to limit damage
to domestic American values to the extent feasible in the event of nuclear war.”26
Consequently, Colin emphasized that missile defense to limit the potential
for societal destruction should be a policy priority, not anathema. This emphasis
went fully against the grain of Western deterrence thinking that unmitigated mutual vulnerability is stabilizing and should be preserved and codified. From the
American perspective, the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
served precisely this purpose by limiting strategic-missile-defense development
and deployment significantly.
Colin’s support for strategic missile defense, however, was a logical extension
of his basic points.
1. Given the variability in decision-making, deterrence is uncertain and can
fail.
2. The United States should consider prudently what to do in the event of
deterrence failure.
3. In the event of war, society should be defended to the extent feasible.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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Colin’s support for strategic missile defense also followed from his attention
to U.S. extended deterrence for allies. He contended that unmitigated U.S. societal vulnerability to attack undermined the credibility of America’s extendeddeterrent threat on behalf of allies. In fact, he believed that the credibility of
U.S. extended deterrence “is very low so long as the United States makes no
noteworthy provision for the protection of its homeland against inevitable Soviet retaliation.”27 His logic was clear: the Soviet Union was not likely to believe
America’s extended-deterrent threat to employ nuclear weapons on behalf of
allies if it could not survive the certain Soviet retaliation. He feared that an unbelievable extended deterrent provided little or no protection for allies and instead
might encourage Russian aggression.
Consequently, Colin advanced two basic reasons for U.S. strategic missile
defense: to protect American society in the event deterrence fails, to the extent possible; and to provide credibility for U.S. extended-deterrent commitments to allies. He did not believe that strategic defense was likely to provide
flawless protection against a determined nuclear attack, but argued that even
plausible imperfect defense capabilities could strengthen the credibility of
extended deterrence and save lives that otherwise would be lost in the event
of deterrence failure. He consistently endorsed U.S. strategic missile defense
for these reasons.28
For a time, Colin was fairly isolated in his views on strategic missile defense.
They were wholly contrary to the intent and purpose of the ABM Treaty, which
received overwhelming support in the U.S. Senate and in general. However, once
again U.S. policy, on a bipartisan basis, eventually caught up with much of Colin’s
thinking. In 2002, the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying strategic missile defense to protect the U.S. homeland against
the limited strategic-missile threats that rogue states could pose.29 U.S. policy had
come to recognize that missile defense that would not be effective against a great
power’s attack still could have great value. In 2010, the Obama administration
listed as first priority defending “the homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.”30 This policy priority attributed to strategic missile defense by
the Obama administration is repeated in the Department of Defense’s 2019 Missile Defense Review, along with a discussion of its value for deterrence purposes.31
The Missile Defense Review also includes the following quote from Colin: “U.S.
missile defence can critically reduce an attacker’s confidence in the prospects
for success in its offensive strike planning. Given the inherent and irreducible
uncertainties of war that should fuel doubt in such plans, the additional uncertainty imposed by U.S. missile defence should prove decisively deterring in the
attacker’s calculations.”32 Colin’s thoughts on strategic missile defense remained
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consistent over five decades, and U.S. policy largely, if not entirely, has caught up
on a bipartisan basis.
A review of Colin Gray’s work reveals how easily he moved simultaneously within
the two very different and often mutually exclusive worlds of academia and government policy. His scholarship, over time, contributed to the betterment of U.S.
policy in a number of areas, but nowhere more than in the seemingly arcane and
incredibly consequential arenas of deterrence, defense, and arms control. His
scholarly writings helped move U.S. arms-control policy away from its reductionist action-reaction roots, deterrence policy away from its mechanical mirror
imaging, and missile defense policy toward recognition of the value of strategic
defense. Colin’s ideas and writings were his currency for these developments. He
was an adviser who spoke truth to power with humility and great effect, despite
the harsh criticism he often received for doing so at the time—criticism he typically endured with humor and good grace. It is no overstatement to conclude that
the West is a safer place for his remarkable scholarship and tenacity.
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